| The Arms Trade as Illiberal
Trade Abstract |
|
Ann Markusen |
| In this paper, I chart
the proliferation and changing nature of relationships involved in international
weapons trade, which I call "diagonalization." I then postulate
a set of economic and security outcomes that appear linked to illiberal
arms trade practices and to the phenomenon of offsets in particular. These
include national hyper-specialization, competitive disadvantages for non-arms
sectors, the transformation of defense contractors into trading companies,
faster weapons proliferation and an exacerbation of the one-team arms race,
world over-spending on arms, and the rise of an international military industrial
cartel. I make the case for and marshall the evidence on each. I pay particular
attention to the role of "offsets" in the arms trade, because
they reveal the failings of a system that is both illiberal and one in which
security concerns are subordinate to commercial aspirations. In the present
environment, most nations and firms participating in or tolerating offsets
are uncertain as to whether they gain or lose from them in the aggregate
and are, in any case, skeptical that the growth in their use can be reversed.
I argue that the damage from these forms of illiberal arms trade practices,
in tandem with lax security oversight, is under-estimated, severe and increasing.
Concerted multi-lateral and uni-lateral actions to curtail such practices
by major market participants are in order.
|